The authors examine out-of-sample industry excess return predictability and portfolio allocation using forecast combination methods of industry-level and aggregate accruals, book-to-market, earnings, investment and gross profits. Out-of-sample combination forecasts generate significant industry return predictability. Substantial increases in Sharpe ratios and utility gains demonstrate predictability is not driven primarily by higher risk. Real-time portfolio allocation strategies rotate into long positions in industries with high expected returns and short industries with low expected returns. Over the past thirty years, out-of-sample combination forecasts of accounting variables generate value-weighted industry portfolio payoffs five times greater than a buy-and-hold benchmark. The constructed portfolios consistently beat a buyand-hold benchmark portfolio two-to-one while generating alphas that exceed 10%.
1 Thus, the accounting literature documents that firm-level accounting data can both explain and lead firm-level returns.
In contrast, much of the finance literature on stock return predictability focuses on forecasting excess market returns with select macroeconomic or aggregate financial variables such as the lagged dividend price ratio (e.g. Fama and French [1989] and Chen [2009] ).
2 Our paper instead examines the ability of industry-level and aggregate accounting variables to predict industry excess stock returns. It then explores whether we can count on these industry return forecasts to select long-short industry portfolios in real-time that consistently outperform a buy-and-hold strategy in terms of average return, terminal payout and Sharpe ratio.
The focus on industry-level data offers several advantages compared to prior work on aggregate predictability. First, a considerable amount of wealth is actively managed by portfolio managers in industry/sector portfolios; as a result, it is important to identify potential strategies that evaluate the economic relevance of predictability via portfolio allocation strategies.
Vardharaj and Fabozzi [2007] demonstrate that "allocation policy explains one-third to nearly three-quarters of among-fund variation in returns, nearly 90 percent of across-time variation."
Yet, the academic literature has neglected the salience of industry portfolio allocation. Second, forecasting the relevance of industry accounting variables on future industry returns is important as this predictive relationship may differ relative to the more studied equity premium relationship between the market return and aggregate accounting variables. For example, Sloan [1996] , Kothari et al. [2006] and Hirshleifer et al. [2009] find that firm-level accounting variables have different effects on firm-level returns than tests evaluating these relationships using aggregate data. Our focus on industries occurs because they are a convenient way of aggregating individual firms for time series analysis. Fama and French provide consistent industry data over several decades; whereas, time series analysis at the firm level is complicated by frequent firm entry and exit that limits time series data and leads to survival bias, the presence of very large numbers of firms for short periods of time, and potential problems with the tremendous variability associated with firm-level data.
Third, the evaluation of the link between 43 industry accounting variables and 43 valueweighted (VW) industry excess returns implies multiple (albeit correlated) testing of the predictive relationship and portfolio allocation to assess robustness. 4 Predictability differences between individual industry and industry portfolio returns are further likely to vary along the business cycle and across decades, so evaluating predictability and portfolio allocation among numerous industries across time presents more robust evidence than testing only one time series such as the market return.
A number of prominent finance papers posit that return predictability can occur when information is not instantaneously transmitted, particularly for stocks with low analyst coverage or low market capitalization (e.g. Lo and MacKinlay [1990] , Breenan et al. [1993] , and Hong and Stein [1999] ). Hong et al. [2000] , in particular, provide strong evidence that gradual diffusion of information occurs for small stocks, those not extensively covered by analysts, and when firms with low analyst coverage have "bad news" to report. Hou [2007] supports the gradual diffusion model, finding that big firms lead smaller firms within the same industries and returns sluggishly adjust to negative information. Hong et al. [2007] explain how industry returns lead aggregate returns by up to two months and motivate their results with a gradual information model, concluding that "findings suggest that stock markets react with a delay to information in industry excess returns regarding fundamentals and that information diffuses only gradually across markets." Cohen and Frazzini [2008] further demonstrate that returns do not promptly incorporate news concerning economically related firms, which generates return predictability across assets; they attribute predictability to investor inattention. 5 These findings suggest that gradual diffusion of information can be effective in motivating industry return predictability.
A preview of our results reveals several compelling findings. Combination forecasts of industry-level and aggregate accruals, book-to-market, earnings, investment and gross profits ratios are significant in forecasting 26 one-quarter-ahead industry excess returns. Sharpe ratios are higher than the benchmark in 34 industries and are more than 10% greater than the benchmark in most industries. Further, utility gains relative to the benchmark are substantial, averaging 5% across industries. Both the higher Sharpe ratios and utility gains demonstrate that the increased predictability generated by combination forecasts is not at the expense of correspondingly higher risk.
The focus of our paper is the implication of out-of-sample industry predictability on portfolio allocation. We show that forecasts of industry returns that combine information from accounting variables in real-time lead to sizeable portfolio gains relative to a passive buy-andhold strategy. An industry rotation strategy that selects the top decile of industries with the highest expected returns and shorts the bottom decile of industries with the lowest expected returns using a 130-30 weighting strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold benchmark by nearly five times. The returns of the long-short strategies are greater than the benchmark 67% of the time and, importantly, this accuracy is consistent over three decades. We also utilize a more leveraged 200-100 strategy that fully shorts industries with the lowest expected returns and reinvests the proceeds into industries with the highest expected returns. Results highlight terminal dollar payoffs nine times the benchmark. Further, a Fama and French three-factor model demonstrates significant alpha; e.g., a 130-30 (200-100) portfolio allocation strategy generates an alpha of 10.5% (19.4%).
MOTIVATION, DATA and METHODOLOGY Motivation
In our study we combine quarterly industry-level and economy-wide data from 1976.1 to 2013.4 for accruals, book-to-market, earnings, investment and gross profits information to forecast stock returns as economic fundamentals should be not only linked to stock returns, but should also successfully predict these returns if information diffuses gradually. The relevance of accruals in providing an improved summary measure of firm performance is demonstrated in an important paper by Dechow [1994] . Barth et al. [1999] argue that accrual accounting is at the heart of earnings management, and accruals provide explanatory power in the equity market beyond that of the book-to-market ratio alone. The importance of earnings goes back to the seminal paper by Ball and Brown [1968] , and is cited in a large number of works including Bernard and Thomas [1989] and Nichols and Wahlen [2004] . French [1995, 2015] show that the book-to-market ratio is an important factor in explaining the cross section of stock returns. Recent work by Novy-Marx [2013] documents that gross profits (revenue minus cost of goods sold) is an important variable in explaining the cross section of returns while Aharoni et al. [2013] find that investment explains returns. In their most recent paper, Fama and French [2015] introduce a five-factor model with investment and gross profits augmenting their three-factor model, demonstrating that these variables help explain the cross section of stock returns.
Our paper in contrast stresses the importance of evaluating predictability and portfolio performance over time and adopts the perspective of a real-world investor based on an out-ofsample (OOS) framework, as in-sample methodology may mask instability between financial variables (Goyal and Welch [2008] ). The accounting literature further finds evidence that the relationship between accounting variables and stock returns may have deteriorated over-time while also exhibiting temporal instability (e.g. Amir and Lev [1996] and Collins et al. [1997] ).
Hence, it is important to evaluate predictability and allocation over a long sample period and adopt a methodology that is relatively robust to such potential breaks. Hendry and Clements [2004] and Timmermann [2006] demonstrate that while structural instabilities are prevalent in individual predictive models, combination forecast methods palliate these instabilities and improve the overall performance of out-of-sample prediction. Rapach et al. [2010] show that combination forecast methods mitigate temporal instability of individual predictive regression models, and provide stable, consistent forecasts for the S&P 500 relative to the random walk. Out-of-sample testing of combination forecasts is particularly relevant if the data-generating process evolves over time and utilizes a large number of potential explanatory variables, as in-sample analysis tends to over-fit, leading to spurious results and misspecification. Combination methods are appropriate when (1) it is difficult to determine which variables are most relevant a priori and (2) the specified model is potentially subject to instability inherently resulting from ongoing, unobservable shocks. Since these conditions should characterize industry returns as well, we consider OOS combination forecast methods.
We begin by positing the following bivariate predictive regression model, a standard framework for analyzing return predictability:
( 1) where r i,t+1 is the time t+1 return for industry i in excess of the risk-free rate, x j t is a potential predictive variable, and e j i,t+1 is a disturbance term with a mean of zero. We focus on OOS return predictability as it is of critical importance for investors making decisions utilizing realtime information and divide the total sample -consisting of T observations for r i,t+1 and x j t -into an in-sample period consisting of the first n 1 observations (note this is a fixed rolling window, where n 1 =55), and an OOS period consisting of the last n 2 observations (in our case, n 2 =96). We use a rolling window to allow coefficient estimates to slowly evolve over time.
7 The initial OOS forecast of the return for industry i based on predictor x j t is represented as:
are the OLS estimates of a j i and b j i , respectively, generated by regressing
t=2 on a constant and {x
t=1 . Continuing this process throughout the OOS period, we generate a series of n 2 OOS return forecasts based on x j t : {r
t=n 1 , where n 1 is a fixed window. This forecasting exercise simulates the real-time information available to a forecaster throughout the OOS forecast period. In order to incorporate information from these individual predictive regression forecasts, for a given industry i, we combine them based on the following:
wherer c i,t+1 denotes the combined forecast for the return in industry i, and w j,t represents the information weighting used within a combination forecast. We use Stock and Watson's [2004] discounted MSFE procedure, "where the weights depend inversely on the historical performance of each individual forecast."
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Following Campbell and Thompson [2008] , we impose 'sensible' restrictions on the OOS forecasting procedure and assume that investors rule out a negative equity premium by setting the forecast to zero when it is negative. They determine that "these restrictions never worsen and almost always improve the OOS performance of our predictive regressions." Additionally, we use their OOS R 2 statistic, R 2 OS , to compare ther i,t+1 andr i,t+1 forecasts, where r i,t+1 = 1 t t k=1 r i,k represents the relevant benchmark model under the null hypothesis of no predictability. The R 2 OS statistic is akin to the familiar in-sample R 2 and is given by:
The R [2010]. The utility metric incorporates the risk borne by an investor over the OOS period, and represents the average utility for a mean-variance investor with relative risk aversion parameter value of three who allocates his/her portfolio monthly between stocks and risk-free treasuries with forecasts of the equity premium based on the historical average. We assume that the investor estimates variance using a twelve-year rolling window of quarterly returns. The utility gain (or certainty equivalent return) represents the portfolio management fee that an investor is willing to pay to have access to the additional information available in the combination forecast relative to the information in the historical average equity premium.
RESULTS
Exhibit 1 presents in-sample evidence using the standard bivariate predictive regression models in columns I-V for our five industry-specific accounting variables and our five aggregate accounting variables for 43 value-weighted (VW) industries. Given our focus on the relevance of OOS combination forecasting methods, for conciseness, we present average and median adjusted R 2 statistics across the 43 industries as well as the number of industries for which these predictive models are statistically significant. R 2 statistics for all five industry-specific and aggregate variables average less than 3% across the 43 industries, and most industries are not significant. Thus, accounting variables using the standard bivariate predictive regression model do not significantly forecast industry stock returns.
Column VI uses a multivariate regression approach with all ten explanatory variables; the top panel reports in-sample results and shows the average adjusted R 2 increases to 6.0% with 25 industries significant at the 5% level. However, a "Kitchen Sink" approach -a multivariate regression framework that uses all applicable explanatory variables -typically leads to overfitting within the in-sample period and results in poor overall fit for the OOS period (Clark [2004] ). Goyal and Welch (2008) hence recommend OOS methodology to simulate a regression in real-time and avoid over-fitting and false inference. Their kitchen-sink approach has a large negative OOS fit. Our results are similar; e.g., OOS results in VI (bottom panel) indicate that zero industries are significant and the average OOS R 2 (R 2 OS ) are less than zero. While a multivariate regression approach results in relatively high in-sample predicability, its failure OOS suggests an alternative approach of combining information from multiple variables; e.g., OOS combination forecast methods.
Exhibit 2 combines OOS bivariate forecasts from 1990.1-2013.4 for industry-level and aggregate accruals, book-to-market, earnings, investment and gross profits. We additionally utilize principal components of book-to-market ratios for the 43 industries using an expanding window in order to avoid a look-ahead bias. Column I reveals average R 2 OS statistics of 2.8%, and 26 of the 43 industries are significant. Rapach et al. [2010] report that "small positive R 2 OS , such as 0.5% for monthly data and 1.0% for quarterly data, can signal an economically meaningful degree in terms of increased portfolio returns for an investor." In comparison, their work finds an R 2 OS statistic of 1.2%; hence, our average predictability finding of 2.8% indicates that combining information from accounting variables contributes to sizable industry predictability.
According to Campbell and Thompson [2008] , relatively small positive R 2 OS values lead to an economically meaningful degree of return predictability, "even very small R 2 statistics are relevant for investors because they can generate large improvements in portfolio performance" and "the right way to judge the magnitude of R 2 is to compare it with the squared Sharpe ratio
OS is large relative to S 2 , then an investor can use the information in the predictive regression to obtain a large proportional increase in portfolio return." They report a monthly S 2 of 1.2% along with a corresponding monthly R 2 OS of 0.43%, suggesting that a mean-variance investor increases portfolio returns by a factor of 0.43/1.2 = 36%. Following this analysis, column II reports that a similar investor can boost her portfolio returns an average of 40%, and 17 industries yield gains exceeding 50%.
Columns III and IV report Sharpe ratios for both the autoregressive benchmark (SBM K) and combination forecasts (SCF ). On average, SCF equals 0.30 which is 13% higher than the benchmark's 0.266; further, SCF exceeds SBM K in 34 of 43 industries, and is considerably higher (i.e., more than 10% greater) in 26 industries. Combination forecasts also achieve impressive annual utility gains that average 5%; additionally, ∆γ > 4% in 33 industries, which represents material economically gains since this statistic is associated with annual management fees. In comparison, both Campbell and Thompson [2008] and Rapach et al. [2010] report utility gains of approximately 1%. Hence, combination forecasts of accounting variables generate utility gains that are relatively large, and further signal that the increases in predictability are not solely driven by increases in risk.
The bottom row of Exhibit 2 reports results for the market portfolio (the Fama-French value-weighted quarterly returns for the market, R m -R f ) and a simple 1/N portfolio, where the portfolio is an equal-weighted average of the 43 industry excess returns. In this case, combination forecasts combine only the aggregate accounting variables, and the market benchmark is the standard random walk. The R 2 OS for the market exceeds 3% and is significant; the portfolio exceeds 2.6%. Both statistics imply that combining accounting information leads to meaningful aggregate predictability. The Campbell-Thompson metric demonstrates that a mean-variance investor can boost their return by more than a third for both portfolios. Further, Sharpe ratios for the market and industry portfolios are 37% and 26% greater, respectively, than their benchmarks. The market and industry portfolios possess utility gains of 7.5% and 6.1% and denote consequential material economic gains. Thus, combination forecasts of accounting variables predict the market as well as a portfolio of value-weighted industries.
Exhibit 3 highlights alternative predictability results using a dozen macroeconomic and financial variables from Goyal and Welch [2008] . Rapach et al. [2010] demonstrate that combining these variables significantly forecasts aggregate excess monthly returns.
9 Can these variables also forecast industry returns? Do macroeconomic variables outperform accounting variables in forecasting industry returns?
Results using the dozen Goyal and Welch variables indicate that combining information leads to average R 
INDUSTRY-ROTATION PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
Pesaran and Timmermann [1995] report that "An alternative approach to evaluating the economic significance of stock market predictability would be to see if the evidence could have been exploited successfully in investment strategies. This can be done by evaluating portfolio allocation in "real time," and see if these portfolios systematically generate excess returns of forecasting performance, such as the directional accuracy (e.g., the proportion of times the sign of excess returns is correctly predicted) of the forecasts." Similar to most predictive regression papers, their work forecasts the aggregate return so portfolio allocation is simply whether the investor is in or out of the market, depending on whether the aggregate return forecasts are positive or negative. In our case, OOS industry allocation consists of rotating into industries predicted to perform well and shorting industries predicted to perform poorly. Evaluating performance of combination forecasts by decade is thus relevant for understanding overall portfolio performance.
Based on an initial investment of $100 in 1984.1, the VW buy-and-hold portfolio generates a payoff of $944 over 30 years with an average return of 2.3% and Sharpe ratio of 0.255. Exhibit 4 shows that the top forecasted decile (quintile) leads to average returns of 3.5% (3.2%), a payoff of $2,609 ($2,341) and Sharpe ratios of .286 (.308). There is also a distinct difference between the top and bottom forecasted deciles and quintiles. The short position possesses average returns for the forecasted bottom decile (quintile) of 0.9% (1.5%), and a payoff of only $145 ($297). Interestingly, the Sharpe ratios for the quintile are higher than the decile ratios even though the quintile's average return and payoff are lower. This likely occurs due to greater diversification, as selecting a greater number of industries for the quintile portfolio reduces the overall mean (because the investor is selecting the nine highest forecasted industries instead of the top four), but the portfolio possesses a lower variance and enjoys more stable returns.
Both the decile and quintile long strategies outperform the benchmark a surprising 60% of the time, generating returns higher (lower) in 72 (48) months; further, both strategies consistently exceed the benchmark in all three decades (%1 st , %2 nd and %3 rd ) with higher forecasted decile returns of 60%, 55% and 66% of the time. The short portfolio also consistently identifies poorly performing industries; e.g., over the past three decades, the bottom decile underperforms the benchmark 67%, 60% and 63% of the time. Results in column V highlight that forecasted returns of the top decile possess average returns greater than the bottom decile two-thirds of the time (e.g., the long portfolio exceeds the short portfolio 65% of the time). These results are remarkably consistent as the top forecasted decile exceeds the bottom forecasted decile 75%, 55% and 66% of the past 120 quarters. Quintile results are similar and reinforce the message that combination forecasts of accounting variables consistently identify both the top and bottom performing industries to go long and to short.
Panel A of Exhibit 5 reinforces these results by illustrating logged payoffs for the long and short industry portfolios. The figure clearly displays noticeable persistent differences in the top and bottom forecasted decile returns over 30 years; i.e., the long decile portfolio frequently outperforms the benchmark and increases over time, while the short portfolio underperforms compared to the benchmark and displays no upward trend over 30 years.
The top half of Exhibit 4 also shows substantial average returns and payoffs for the longshort strategies. The 200-100 strategy possesses average returns of 6.2% and 5.0% for the decile and quintile strategies, which are strikingly higher than the benchmark's 2.3%. The payoffs for both strategies exceed $9,000 -nearly 10 times the buy-and-hold benchmark. The Additionally, the long-short payoffs exhibit wide divergences. For instance, for 5 and 10 industry portfolios, the long payoffs are $2,790 and $1,900 while the short payoffs are $208 and $396
implying that the long portfolios are approximately 13 and 5 times their respective short portfolios. Overall, results reveal that combination forecasts reliably select long and short industry portfolios that consistently out-perform the buy-and-hold.
Portfolio Performance and Alternative Specifications
Exhibit 7 presents a portfolio scheme that selects the highest and lowest decile and quintile of industries for the first quarter of each year and then holds this portfolio for one year. The yearly rotation strategy substantially outperforms the buy-and-hold in terms of return and dollar payoff, but not the quarterly allocation strategy in Exhibit 4. For instance, the highest forecasted decile returns generates an average return of 3.0% and payoff of $1,201 compared to the benchmark's return of 2.3% and $944 payoff. The 200-100 and 130-30 long-short strategies generate returns 66% and 68% greater than the benchmark, and generate annual returns that consistently exceed the benchmark 64% of the time over the past 30 years.
Following Nichols and Wahlen [2004] , we evaluate a portfolio strategy that adjusts for size.
They label this method 'cumulative abnormal returns' as it subtracts the returns from the size decile the industry belongs (which is obtained from the French library under 'Portfolios formed on size'). This implies the average industry portfolio has a cumulative abnormal return of approximately zero; therefore, a successful long position after 30 years induces an average return greater than zero and a payoff greater than $100; conversely, a successful short strategy identifies industry returns less than zero and a payoff less than $100. Inspection of Exhibit 7
(bottom panel) shows the top forecasted decile delivers an abnormal return of 1.7% compared to the bottom decile of -0.8%. The long position generates average returns greater than the short (%L > S) in all three decades.
Exhibit 8 illustrates the top (long) and bottom (short) forecasted abnormal (size-adjusted) returns, or more precisely, abnormal payoffs. The long strategy clearly illustrates positive average returns over most of the sample (59% of the time the slope is increasing) and payoff of $234. In contrast, the short strategy has a negative slope over 64% of the time, and has average returns well below zero (-0.8%); the payoff is only $14 and implies a loss of 86% of its value. The figure is similar in spirit to the value relevant approach of Ball and Brown [1968] and Beaver et al. [1979] . Their work identifies the top and bottom decile of earnings by firm and plots the returns of these firms. Firms are value relevant if returns of the top and bottom decile of earnings sharply increase and decrease respectively, revealing a large difference which emerges between the two returns. There is, however, one key difference between the value relevance approach and our procedure. Our method is an implementable real-time portfolio allocation strategy, since it employs forecasts, not actual accounting variables. Exhibit 5 shows that the top and bottom deciles of forecasted industry returns display considerable differences that grow over-time; by 2013.4, the top decile exceeds the bottom decile by more than 16 times.
A 200-100 strategy yields an excess return of 4.3% and a payoff of $897, which is approximately nine times the buy-and-hold, and also consistently delivers positive returns over three decades.
Inspection by decade highlights that the portfolio allocation outperforms the benchmark by a wide margin in all three decades.
How does the inclusion of alternative combination forecast specifications affect industry portfolio allocation? Exhibit 9 analyzes the robustness of our results using the highest and lowest deciles. The top panel presents portfolio allocation that combines forecasts from a dozen macroeconomic/financial variables used in Exhibit 3. Portfolio results show that while macroeconomic and financial variables outperform the buy-and-hold, they do not beat allocation methods using accounting variables. For instance, for the 200-100 strategy, the average returns, payoffs and Sharpe ratios are 5.3%, $3,159 and .254, which is considerably less than 6.2%, $9,108
and .305 (reported in Exhibit 4). To assess the importance of industry accounting variables, we report portfolio allocation using only aggregate accounting variables. Results demonstrate that both earnings and book-to-market, as well as investment and gross profits, lead to economic gains in portfolio allocation, but these gains are larger when forecasts from all these variables along with accruals are combined together. We also examine the role of accruals, investment and profits as all three variables are not traditional return predictors;
130-30 (200-100) results reveal payoffs five (eight) times the benchmark. Lastly, we combine forecasts from the dozen macroeconomic/financial variables and our ten accounting variables.
These results in contrast exhibit a small improvement in terminal payment compared to the accounting results.
Exhibit 10 investigates the magnitude of alpha after controlling for the three Fama and French [1993] risk factors. We regress the decile portfolio performance over the past 120 quarters against the excess return of the market (MKT), the small-minus-big (SMB) and the high- Second "bad news travels slowly" implies that portfolio allocation should be more accurate for poorly performing industries. Results from Exhibit 6 for instance show that 9/10 and 17 of 20 of the bottom industry payoffs and average returns are consistently less than the buy-andhold (%IND < BH); these results highlight a remarkable ability to identify industries subject to bad news. The percentage of the bottom 10, 15 and 20 are 67%, 79% and 75% and also support the ability to identify industries that perform less than the benchmark. Further, the success of the long-short 200-100 relies heavily on the accuracy of the short strategy (which yields returns less than the buy-and-hold over 30 years twice as often).
Third, we conducted predictability and portfolio allocation for equal-weighted (EW) industries (results available upon request). VW industries place greater weight on market capitalization, and hence their industries tend to be bigger than EW industries. Larger industries tend to receive more analyst coverage and, as a result, information should diffuse more slowly in EW industries that are smaller and with fewer analysts, thus making portfolio allocation more profitable. Results highlight an EW payoff for the 200-100 deciles of $55,863 compared to the VW payoff of $9,108; further, of 20 EW industries identified to short, all 20 EW industries underperform the benchmark. These results highlight that bad news travels slowly, particularly for industries that receive little attention.
CONCLUSION
Out-of-sample forecast methods that combine information from industry-level and aggregate accruals, book-to-market, earnings, investment and gross profits data document significant predictability of industry excess returns. We use these industry forecasts to construct portfolios that rotate into industries forecasted to perform well and short industries forecasted to perform poorly. Long-short positions deliver portfolio payoffs nearly nine times the benchmark, and their relatively large Sharpe ratios indicate the performance increases are not driven primarily by risk. Portfolio allocation allowing for size-adjusted returns generate a long position with payoffs sixteen times the short position. Additionally, combining information from accounting variables generate average returns, Sharpe ratios, utility gains and portfolio payoffs that outperform traditional macroeconomic and financial predictors.
Overall, portfolio allocation results show that combination forecasts of accounting variables consistently outperform a buy-and-hold strategy over the last three decades. Average returns for industries selected to go long are consistently above the buy-and-hold portfolio in all three decades, while average returns in the bottom forecasted decile of industries are consistently below the buy-and-hold portfolio. Long-short positions in all three decades generate returns substantially above the benchmark 67% of the time. Thus, combination forecasts generated from accounting variables consistently and substantially beat the buy-and-hold benchmark.
ENDNOTES EXHIBIT 1
In-Sample Predictive Regression Results, 1976 Results, .1-2013 Ind-Level Notes: Columns I-V report in-sample R 2 statistics based on the bivariate predictive regression models, where Ind-Level (Agg-Level) use industry i (aggregate averages) of the accounting variables. ALL i R 2 and ALL i R 2 OS report the in-sample and out-of-sample R 2 statistics for a multivariate regression using all five industry and all five aggregate variables, respectively. ACC i , BM i and EARN i represent a 4-quarter moving average of accruals-to-total assets, book-to-market ratio and earnings-to-total assets for industry i. INV i and GP i are investment-to-total assets and gross profits-to-total assets.
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EXHIBIT 2 OOS Combination Forecast Results, 1990 Results, .1-2013 Notes: Exhibit 2 reports out-of sample R 2 (R 2 OS ), Campbell-Thompson metric (R 2 OS /S 2 ) as well as quarterly Sharpe ratios for the benchmark (SBK) and combination forecast (SCF ). ∆γ represents utility gain, or the annualized portfolio management fee that an investor with a risk-aversion coefficient of three (i.e. γ=3) would be willing to pay for the corresponding forecasting model. 1/N represents an equal-weighted portfolio of the 43 VW industries. MKT is the excess market return from French's data library. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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EXHIBIT 3 OOS Results, Macro and Aggregate/Industry Variables, 1990 Variables, .1-2013 Notes: Exhibit 10 presents results from the Fama-French Three-Factor model. Combination forecast estimates are regressed against the market excess return (MKT), the small-minus-big factor (SMB) and high-minus-low factor (HML). * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
